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Nguyen: Nguyen: ERISA's Unspoken Standard:

ERISA's Unspoken Standard:
The Fight for Employee Benefits
Riedl v. GeneralAmerican Life Insurance Co.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Employee benefit plans provide a myriad of benefits to millions of workers
throughout the United States. Most Americans receive insurance benefits
through employer-provided benefit plans. In fact, nearly seventy-five percent
of all American workers receive some form of insurance through their
workplace. 2 Health insurance coverage provided as a fringe benefit of
employment protects more than 150 million Americans.3 A significant amount
oflife insurance is obtained through employment.4 Furthermore, most disability
income insurance coverage is "offered as part of an employee group benefit
package."5
Due to the prevalence of'suchplans, Congress sought to protect the interests
of these covered employees and their beneficiaries. 6 The result of Congress's
efforts was the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") in 1974.' Although ERISA is a "'comprehensive and reticulated

1. 248 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. HEALTH INs. Ass'N OF AM., BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1999-2000, at
4, fig. 1.1. In 1997, there were 122.7 million wage and salary earners in the United
States. Id. Ninety-one million of those workers received insurance through their
employers. Id.
3. Id. at 23. An estimated 152 million Americans are covered by health insurance
offered by employee benefit plans. Id.
4. In 1999, group life insurance constitutedthirty-nine percent of all life insurance
policies in force. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INsURERS, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2000,
at 2, tbl. 1.1. The number of group life insurance policies has increased 5.9% annually
since 1989. Id. "Group life insurance is a contract between an insurance company and
some group to insure all members of that group." Id. at 16. Life insurance provided by
employee benefit plans, professional associations, and unions represent a significant
amount of all group life insurance policies. See id.
5. Id. at 58. Workers are more readily able to obtain disability insurance through
work due to the prohibitive costs of obtaining an individual policy. Id. Only 12.3% of
all disability income insurance in force is individual policies. Id. at 57, tbl. 3.3. The
remaining 87.7% of disability income insurance is provided by group plans. Id.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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statute,"' 8 numerous battles over its language have garnered much attention from
the court system during the twenty-eight years since its enactment.
One such dispute concerns the appropriate standard of review to employ
when adjudicating a denial of benefits under ERISA. In Riedl v. General
American Life InsuranceCo.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit limited the use of an abuse of discretion standard in reviews of claim
denials based on factual determinations under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) ° to
circumstances in which the plan provides that discretionary authority is granted
to the plan administrator." In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit clearly adopted the
majority rule applying a de novo standard of review.
After establishing the facts and holding of the instant decision, this Note
briefly discusses the history of ERISA and examines the differing rationales
regarding whether to apply an abuse of discretion" or de novo 3 standard when
reviewing a claim denial based on a factual determination. This Note reviews
major decisions made by the United States Supreme Court on a similar issue, as
well as the majority and minority views on the subject. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that the majority approach to apply a de novo review in such situations
is most appropriate in light of ERISA's goal of protecting beneficiaries of
employee benefit plans.

8. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989) (quoting
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
9. 248 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001).
10. A participant or beneficiary may file suit "to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
11. Riedl, 248 F.3d at 756.
12. "[An abuse of discretion] standard means 'that the court has a range of choice,
and its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range[,] is not
influenced by any mistake of law' or fact, or makes a clear error ofjudgment in balancing
relevant factors." Miscellaneous Docket #1 v. Miscellaneous Docket #2, 197 F.3d 922,
925 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1403
(8th Cir. 1994)).
13. An appeal de novo is defined as "[a]n appeal in which the appellate court uses
the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial
court's rulings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999). "When we review a
district court's decision de novo, we take note of it, and study the reasoning on which it
is based. However, our review is independent and plenary; as the Latin terms suggests,
we look at the matter anew, as though it has come to the courts for the first time." Zervos
v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2001).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/9
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I1. FACTS AND HOLDING
John D. Riedl ("Riedl") was an employee of Phillips Petroleum Company
("Phillips").'4 As such, Riedl participated in a long-term disability insurance
plan issued and administered by General American Life Insurance Company
("General American").' 5 On April 19, 1995, Riedl did not report for work due
to persistent chest pain.' 6 As a result of his medical condition, he did not return
to work for several months and underwent an angioplasty in August 1995.'" One
month after the procedure, Riedl was authorized "to return to work without any
restrictions."' 8 However, he accepted an early retirement package and never
returned to his job at Phillips.' 9 After retiring, Riedl submitted an application for
long-term disability benefits to General American.2" General American denied
the claim and refused coverage on the grounds that Riedl was not eligible for
benefits according to the terms of his insurance policy.2'
Consequently, Riedl filed suit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), m
alleging that he was entitled to disability benefits under the policy.' "Both

14. Riedl, 248 F.3d at 754.
15. Id.
16. Id. Riedl had a history of chronic chest pain and suffered a heart attack in
1993. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 755.
19. Id.
20. Id. Riedl's physician stated that Riedl "was unable to work at any job because
of his chronic chest pain." Id. Also, the Social Security Administration considered Riedl
"permanently and totally disabled" in determining his eligibility for Social Security
benefits. Id.
21. Id. The insurance plan provided that an employee must be .'unable to work
at his regular job or at a reasonable occupation which is available with the Employer'
due to "'injury, sickness, or pregnancy."' Id. at 757-58 (quoting the insurance policy
provision). The doctor who filed an Attending Physician's Statement of Disability Form
concluded that Riedl could not continue employment with Phillips in his original
capacity but was able to perform other work. Id. at 755. General American based its
denial ofRiedl's claim on five grounds: 1) Riedl's cardiologist released him without any
work restrictions; 2) Riedl informed General American that he was able to continue
working; 3) Riedl's decision to cease employment at Phillips was not attributed to his
chest pain but was a result of his acceptance of the early-retirement package offered by
General American; 4) none of Riedl's doctors stated that he was unable to continue
employment at Phillips in any capacity during the qualifying period; and 5) Riedl's
claims of chronic chest pain cannot be supported by any objective evidence. Id. at 757.
22. For the relevant text of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994), see supranote 10.
23. Riedl, 248 F.3d at 755.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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parties filed motions for summaryjudgment." 2' The United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri reviewed de novo General American's
decision to deny Riedl's claim for benefits.' The court granted Riedl's motion
for summary judgment, holding that he clearly established that he was unable to
continue working at Phillips.26
General American appealed, claiming that the district court failed to apply
the correct standard of review.27 General American argued that the district court
should have applied an "abuse of discretion" standard, rather than review the
decision de novo. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the district court applied the appropriate standard of review;29
however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding
that a genuine issue of material fact still existed as to whether Riedl was "totally
disabled" according to the terms of the plan.3" The Eighth Circuit held that
whenever a policy governed by ERISA lacks any provision granting the
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the policy,
the administrator's factual determinations
31
novo.
de
reviewed
be
should
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introductionto ERISA
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to address the significant "growth in
' Congress noted that
[the] size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans."32
"the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their
dependants are directly affected by these plans."33 ERISA subjected any plan
providing fringe benefits to employees to federal regulation.34 Among the
various fringe benefits provided by employee benefit plans regulated by ERISA
are insurance policies purchased on behalf of employees to provide "medical,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755-56.
Id. at 756.
Id.
Id. at 759-60.
Id. at 755-56.

32. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(a) (1994). Congress also noted that "many employees with
long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits." 29 U.S.C. §

1001(a) (1994).
34. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/9
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surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment."35
Through federal regulation, Congress sought to protect participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.36 Section 1001(b) explicitly
states that the underlying policy behind ERISA is "to protect... the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries by... establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to courts. 37
When the administrator of an employee benefit plan wrongfully denies
benefits, a plan participant or beneficiary may file an action to challenge the
administrator's decision.3" Section 1132 permits aplaintiffin such an action "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan."39 ERISA, however, does not expressly provide the standard
of review applicable to such actions.'
B. Application ofDe Novo Review to Plan Term Interpretations
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,4' the United States Supreme
Court held that a de novo standard should apply when reviewing an
administrator's decision to deny a plan participant's claim for benefits in the
absence of a provision granting discretionary authority to the administrator." In
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1994).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
40. See, e.g., l irestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989)
("ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under §
1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations."); Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1991) ("ERISA
is silent on the proper standard by which the district court should review fact findings
made by plan administrators ....
"); Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1555 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 502U.S. 973 (1991) ("ERISA
does not set out the appropriate standard ofreview for evaluating benefit determinations
of plan administrators . ..in actions challenging those determinations under §
1132(a)(1)(B)."); Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1990) ("ERISA does
not specify a standard of review to be used by the district courts in evaluating benefit
denials by plan administrators.").
41. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
42. Id. at 115. Prior to the Court's decision, federal courts applied an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard when reviewing a denial ofbenefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Id.
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reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on principles of trust law.4 3 The
Court noted that "a deferential standard of review [is] appropriate when a trustee
exercises discretionary powers."'
As a result, a reviewing court normally
should not interfere with the judgment of a trustee.45 In order to apply a
deferential standard, a court must be satisfied that the document governing the
plan provides the trustee with such discretionary authority.46 Therefore, the lack
of a provision granting such discretion would require a court to apply a de novo
standard of review.47
Additionally, the Court recognized that ERISA's goal is "'to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries. " '4 Prior to the enactment of
ERISA, courts applied principles of contract law in reviewing a denial of
benefits. 49 Applying a deferential standard of review, even in the absence of
language within the plan granting discretionary authority, "would afford less
protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA
was enacted."5
Therefore, "a denial of benefits challenged under §
1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan
expressly gives the administrator . . . discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."'"

at 109-10.
43. Id. at 110-13, 115. "In determining the appropriate standard of review for
actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles oftrust law." Id. at 111. The
Court noted that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") contains
numerous references to terminology often used in trust law. Id. Furthermore, the Court
reviewed legislative history that confirmed ERISA applied certain principles oftrust law.
Id. at 110; see H.R.REP.NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprintedin1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4649.
44. Bruch, 489 U.S. at I11.
45. Id. '[A] court of equity will not interfere to control [the trustee] in the exercise
of a discretionvested in [him or her]by the instrumentunder which [the trustee] act[s]."'
Id. (quoting Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1875)) (emphasis in original); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) ("Where discretion is conferred upon
the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control
by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.").
46. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 111-12.
47. Id. at 111-12, 115.
48. Id. at 113 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
49. Id. at 112-13. "The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the
judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA." Id.
at 112.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id. at 115.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/9
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The Supreme Court, however, arguably limited its holding to plan term
interpretations, 52 stating that "[t]he discussion... is limited to the appropriate
standard of review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits
based on plan interpretations. We express no view as to the appropriate standard
of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA." a This
statement has created controversy regarding whether a de novo standard is
appropriate in all ERISA reviews ormerely in reviews concerning interpretations
ofplan term limitations. 4 Consequently, the circuit courts are divided regarding
which standard of review is appropriate for factual determinations made by plan
administrators.55

52. See id. at 108; see also Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1556 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied,502 U.S. 973 (1991) ("[A] point
of tension is created by Bruch's express limitation ... and ...the absence ofthe express
limitation in the latter part of the opinion."). Prior to the Supreme Court granting
certiorari, the Third Circuit, in its Bruch decision, limited its holding to plan
interpretations. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 n.9 (3d Cir.
1987), aff'd in partandrev'dinpartby Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). "It should benoted
that we also do not deal here with a determination of fact by a plan administrator. We
leave for another day the definition of the context.., in which courts should defer to
such a determinations [sic]." Id.
53. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 108.
54. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d
1176, 1182 (3d Cir. 1991) ('The split among federal courts on this question results from
divergent readings of the scope ofFirestone'sholding."); Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1556 ("[A]
point of tension is created by Bruch's express limitation ...and.., the absence of the
express limitation in the latter part of the opinion.").
55. See, e.g., Riedl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753, 756 n.2 (8th Cir.
2001) ("We note disagreement among our sister circuits."); Kinstler v. First Reliable
Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) ('The four circuits that have
explicitly considered this issue are divided."); Rowan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 119
F.3d 433,435 (6th Cir. 1997) ("We thus join every other circuit ...
in rejectingPierre.");
Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199,202 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he courts have disagreed
about whether Firestonerequires de novo review only of benefit denials based upon an
interpretation of a plan or also of benefit denials based upon factual determinations.");
see also Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, JudicialReview ofDenial of Health Care
Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income
SecurityAct (ERISA) (29 USCS§ 1132(a)(1)(B))-Post-FirestoneCases, 128 A.L.R. FED.
1,19 (1995).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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C. The CircuitSplit
1. The Majority View: De Novo Review for Factual Determinations
The majority of circuits that have addressed the issue directly have ruled
that the Supreme Court's holding in Bruch should apply to factual
determinations without any distinction from plan term interpretations.56 In
Petrilli v. Drechsel,57 the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to address
whether a de novo review is applicable to plan term interpretations and factual
determinations without any distinction. 8 The court examined the district court's
rationale for distinguishingplan term interpretations and factual determinations.59
It noted that "[t]he Third Circuit in Bruch explicitly reserved comment on the
proper standard of review for factual determinations."6 Arguably, the matter on
appeal to the Supreme Court would be limited to plan term limitations, not
factual determinations.6' The Supreme Court's actual holding, however,
contained no limitation. 2 The Seventh Circuit construed the lack of any limiting
statement in the holding to mean that the Supreme Court had no intention of

distinguishing plan term interpretations from factual determinations:63
[T]he holding strongly suggests that the Court intended de novo
review to be mandatory where administrators were not granted

56. Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1069
(9th Cir. 1999). "The majority of federal appellate courts that have considered the issue
concluded . . . that Firestone did not leave open the issue of whether factual

determinations should be reviewed under a different standard than plan interpretations."
Id.; see, e.g., Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 249-51; Rowan, 119 F.3d at 435-36; Ransey, 77 F.3d
at 202-05; Luby, 944 F.2d at 1179-80, 1181-84; Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins.
Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1990).
57. 910 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 1446. "We have found no circuit court case that has explicitly addressed
this issue . .

. ."

Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. "'It should be noted that we also do not deal here with a determination of
fact by a plan administrator. We leave for another day the definition of the context...
in which courts should defer to such a determination."' Id. (quoting Bruch v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 n.9 (3d Cir. 1987), afd in partandrev 'd in part
by Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115. "[A] denial of benefits... is to be reviewed
discretionary
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator ...
authority to determine eligibility for benefits orto construe the terms of the plan." Bruch,
489 U.S. at 115.
63. Petrilli,910 F.2d at 1446.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/9
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discretion, regardless of whether the denials under review were based
on plan interpretations. If this were not the intent, the Court could
have omitted the words "to determine eligibility forbenefits," from the
above-quoted holding and confined the "unless" clause to "unless the
benefitplan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority
to construe the terms of the plan.""
The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the case involved a plan
interpretation." Therefore, its discussion about the correct standard of review
to apply to factual determinations was dictum."
In Ramsey v. HerculesInc., 7 the Seventh Circuit officially adopted the
position it had postulated several years earlier in Petrilli.' Furthermore, the
Ramsey court noted that, under trust law, "courts do not alter the standard under
which they review a trustee's decision based on the characterization of that
decision as interpretive or factual."'69 Consequently, the court held that there is
"no meaningful distinction between factual determinations and legal
interpretations of plan administrators."70 Because there is no meaningful
distinction between the two types of decisions, the court held that both plan
interpretations and factual determinations should be subject to de novo7review
when a plan does not grant discretionary authority to the administrator. '
The Third Circuit also addressed the issue in Luby v. Teamsters Health,
Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds.72 Similar to the dictum in Petrilli,the Third
Circuit addressed the significance ofthe Supreme Court's limiting statement in
Bruch.3 The court recognized that the courts holding that a deferential standard
of review is appropriate for factual determinations partially have based their

64. Id.
65. Id. "Since we conclude that the denial of Petrilli's benefits was based on a plan
interpretation, we need not choose between these competing interpretations..

. ."

Id.

66. Id. at 1446-47. Several years later, the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to
rule on the issue and held that a de novo review should be applied to factual
determinations. See Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 202-05 (7th Cir. 1996).
67. 77 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. Id. at 202-05. The Seventh Circuit in Ramsey reviewed the dicta portion ofthe
Petrilli opinion in supporting its decision to apply a de novo review to factual
determinations and plan interpretations. Id. at 202-03.
69. Id. at 203.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id.
72. 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991). "The question ... is whether... [a] de novo
review of benefit denials based upon administrator interpretations of ERISA plan
terminology extends to ...factfinding." Id. at 1182.

73. Id. at 1182-83.
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holdings upon the rationale that the Supreme Court's holding must be examined
in light of the limiting statement.74 However, the Third Circuit minimized the
importance of the limiting statement by emphasizing the lack of any limitation
actually contained in the Supreme Court's holding. 5 Instead, the court stated
that the Supreme Court's limiting statement was intended to "distinguish
between remedial actions challenging claim denials brought under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) and remedial actions based on or brought under other ERISA
provisions. '
Another argument the Third Circuit advanced inLuby was that a deferential
review is afforded to governmental agencies due to their expertise.77 Such
expertise is not presumed with plan administrators, who are often "laypersons
appointed . . . sometimes without any legal, accounting, or other training
preparing them for their responsible position... [and with] little knowledge of
the rules of evidence or legal procedures to assist them in factfinding."78 As a
result, the argument in Pierrev. Connecticut GeneralLife Insurance Co./Life
Insurance Co. ofNorth America 79 that a fact-finding body is normally granted
discretion in its fact-finding capacity does not apply to situations involving
layperson plan administrators. 0 Therefore, the expertise of the fact-finding
body, often cited as a reason to apply a deferential standard of review, is not
present in such situations as in other review procedures. 8 Consequently, a de

74. Id.
75. Id. The court supported its holding by citing the rationale used by the Seventh
Circuit in Petrilli.Id. at 1183. For a discussion of the Petrillirationale, see supra notes
57-66 and accompanying text.
76. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183 (emphasis in original). "'We express no view as to the
appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA.'
Id. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989)). This
statement, read in conjunction with the limiting statement immediately preceding it,
appears to distinguish § I 132(a)(1)(B) actions from remedies provided by other ERISA
provisions. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit on this point, stating that
the limiting statement "must be read in tandem with the sentence that follows." Walker
v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
"[T]he limiting language logically means that Firestonewas intended to address the
standard ofreview only under... § 132(a)(1)(B), not under other remedial provisions."
Id.
77. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183. "[G]ovemmental agencies.., are frequently granted
deferential review because of their acknowledged expertise." Id.
78. Id.
79. 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991).
80. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183. For a discussion of the arguments made in Pierre,see
infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
81. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/9
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novo standard is appropriate whenever reviewing aplan administrator's decision
to deny benefits based upon plan limitations or factual determinations. 2
The Sixth Circuit also joined the majority of circuits in rejecting the ruling
reached in Pierre,holding that "factual determinations ofplan administrators in
actions brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) are subject to de novo
review."' 3 The court addressed the rationale behind the Fifth Circuit's holding
and refuted each contention.' First, the Sixth Circuit stated that the Pierrecourt
erroneously applied principles of trust law in reaching its decision. 5 The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit relied on the Restatement (Second)ofTrusts in ruling
that a factual determination should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, rather
than applying a de novo standard.86 However, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the Pierrecourt misapplied the Restatement because the language relied upon
"does not provide any basis for distinguishing between court review of factual
determinations and review of interpretations of claim language."8"
The court also refuted the Fifth Circuit's rationale that fact-finding bodies
are normally granted deference as a reason to apply an abuse of discretion
standard in this situation. 8 The court noted a distinction between fact finding
by administrative bodies and courts and fact finding by employee benefit plan
[t]he reason for treating the two
administrators. 9 The Sixth Circuit stated that '"
situations differently is... that one party to a contract has an incentive to find
facts not in a neutral fashion .... ,,90
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the policy argument that application of a de
novo standard would increase litigation over denial of benefits.9 The court

82. Id. at 1178, 1183.
83. Rowan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 119 F.3d 433,435 (6th Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 436.
85. Id.

86. Id. "The Pierrecourt based its holding primarily on sections 186(b) and 187
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959)." Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id. Deference "'under these circumstances is very different than deferring to
a plan administrator."' Id. (quoting Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 813, 824 (6th
Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit also supported the majority position, stating that courts,
unlike plan administrators, are "subject to a panoply of constitutional, statutory and
procedural strictures." Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d
1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
90. Rowan, 119 F.3d at 436 (quoting Perez, 96 F.3d at 824).
91. Id. "The Pierre court's policy argument that failure to defer to plan
administrators' factual findings will lead to a flood of litigation is also unpersuasive."
Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the application of two different standards for factual
determinations and plan interpretations would lead to increased litigation. Walker, 180
F.3d at 1070. Factual determinations and plan interpretations are interrelated. Id. "If
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emphasized that a de novo standard only applies in situations where the plan fails
to grant discretionary authority to the administrator.92 To avoid a de novo review
of claim denials, one need only draft a provision granting such discretion to the
administrator. 93
2. The Minority View: The Fifth Circuit's Application of
an Abuse of Discretion Standard
Although it was among the first courts to address the issue, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Pierre, which made a distinction between plan term
interpretations and factual determinations when deciding the appropriate
standard to be applied by a reviewing court, has become the minority view.94
The court acknowledged that an administrator must make two separate
determinations before deciding to award or to deny benefits." The administrator
first must make a factual determination; 96 the administrator then must "determine
whether those facts constitute a claim to be honored under the terms of the
plan."'97 The Fifth Circuit stated that the holding in Bruch applied to plan term
interpretations, not to factual determinations." Furthermore, the court held that
"it is completely consistent with the principles of trust law to apply a different
standard of review to each of these categories of decision." 99

review were bifurcated[,] ...we predict an unnecessary cascade of litigation over
whether an administrator's action was a plan interpretation or a factual determination."
Id. "
92. Rowan, 119 F.3d at 436. "The de novo standard of review applies only when
the plan does not explicitly vest fact-finding discretion in the plan administrator." Id.
93. Id. The Seventh Circuit also reasoned that employers concerned with
"excessive layers of review, or burdensome litigation, can write ...
their plans to give
discretion to their plan administrators." Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 205 (7th
Cir. 1996). "We are reenforced in our conclusion by recognition ofthe relative ease with
which ERISA plans may be worded explicitly to reserve to plan administrators the
discretionary authority that will insulate.., their decisions from de novo review."
Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243,251 (2d Cir. 1999).
94. Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552,
1556-59 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973 (1991).
95. Id. at 1557.
96. Id. "[An administrator] must determine the facts underlying the claim for
benefits." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. "Bruch addressed the proper standard of review that is to be given to the
plan administrator's [plan term] determination. Bruch did not speak to [factual
determinations]." Id.
99. Id.
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Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187,"° the Fifth Circuit

agreed with the Supreme Court that, when discretion is granted to a trustee, a
judicial review only will interfere with the trustee's decision when there is an
abuse of discretion.' Nevertheless, the court stated that "an ERISA trustee..
. is granted some inherent discretion."'" The court further concluded that this
discretion includes making factual determinations. 13 Therefore, a reviewing
court only should reverse the administrator's decision as to factual
determinations when there is an abuse of discretion.'
Additionally, the court found that "[flactual determinations are generally
reviewed under some discretionary standard such as... abuse of discretion."'0 5

Therefore, the use of a deferential standard for factual determinations "does not
result in the loss of any substantial rights comparable to the loss... in applying
the arbitrary and caprici6us standard to term interpretations.""'5
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit noted that most reviewingbodies defer to the
fact finder's decisions.7 This is true of"a district court giving deference to an
administrative body, or an appellate court giving deference to the district
court."' As a result, the court stated that the plan administrator, as a finder of
fact, should not be treated differently.0 9
Finally, the Fifth Circuit presented a practical reason as to why deference
should be afforded to plan administrators in making factual determinations." 0
The court noted that the plan administrator must make several determinations
before awarding or denying benefits."' By applying a de novo review, the

100. "Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise
of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse
by the trustee of this discretion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
101. Pierre,932 F.2d at 1557-58.

102.
103.
individual
104.

Id. at 1558 (emphasis in original).
Id. "[T]his ... discretion includes passing on issues of fact that determine
eligibility for benefits." Id.
Id.

105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 1559. The purpose of this deference is to "respect[] the advantage of
the fact finder while also protecting against [an] abuse of... power." Id.

108. Id.
109. Id. "We see no reason here why the plan administrator, i.e., the trier of fact,

should be placed in a different status." Id.
10. Id.
111. Id. The administrator must examine factors such as: length of service by the
insured, unused benefits, nature of the injury, location of the injury-causing event,
whether the injury occurred as a result of an accident, or whether the injury occurred
while the insured was acting within the scope of employment. Id.
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reviewing court essentially would be substituting itself in place of the
administrator." 2 Moreover, the court opined that application of such a standard
of review would lead to increased litigation, and the expenses of such litigation
3
would be drawn from funds used to pay benefits to claimants."
After analyzing arguments made by other courts in favor of applying a de
novo standard,"' the Fifth Circuit rejected these approaches and held that an
abuse of discretion standard is appropriate when reviewing an administrator's
factual determinations."'5
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Riedl, 1 6 the Eighth Circuit initially addressed the standard of review
applied by the lower court. 7 The court observed that neither party disputed the
fact that the employee benefit plan failed to grant the administrator discretionary
authority." 8 It then addressed General American's contention that the Supreme
Court's holding in Bruch did not apply to the instant case because the Supreme
Court's holding "is limited to plan interpretations and does not extend to factbased determinations.""..9 Consequently, General American concluded that,
because the instant case involved a factual determination and not a plan
interpretation, an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate. 2 '
The Court disagreed with General American's argument, holding that such
a rule "construes Bruch too narrowly and urges upon us a difference that should
not be controlling."'' The court then noted that an administrator must make

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1559-62. The Fifth Circuit examined the rationale behind the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits' decisions that seemed to mandate a de novo standard when
reviewing an administrator's factual determinations. Id.
115. Id. at 1562.
116. The court also addressed the issue whether Riedl was, in fact, disabled. This
Note, however, is primarily concerned with the standard of review the court decided to
employ, rather than any actual factual findings made by the court. Therefore, this Note
will not address the factual findings by the Eighth Circuit in any length.
117. Riedl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753,755 (8th Cir. 2001). "As an
initial matter, we must address whether the District Court applied the appropriate
standard of review." Id.
118. Id. "It is undisputed that Phillip's long-term disability plan does not give the
plan's administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan." Id.
119. Id. at 756.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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factual determinations in addition to applying those facts to the plan's terms in
order to determine whether the claimant is eligible for benefits.'2 The court
stated: "[t]o rule that an administrator's fact-based determinations should be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even though the plan lacks the appropriate
discretionary language, does not give sufficient effect to Bruch's holding."'"
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that a de novo standard of review is
appropriate when a court is called upon to review an administrator's decision to
deny benefits based upon a factual determination unless the terms of the plan
grant the administrator discretionary authority "to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." 24
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Riedl.1z The court stated that there were genuine issues of
material fact that remained to be resolved and remanded the case to the district
26
court for further proceedings.

122. Id. "Often an employee's eligibility for benefits under a plan depends both
on an administrator's determination of certain facts, and on the application of those facts
to the terms of the plan." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 759-60.
126. Id. The court examined the record and held that there remained a disputed
issue concerning whether Riedl was actually disabled. Id. at 756-60.
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V. COMMENT
A. The Doctrine of ContraProferentem1"
The doctrine of contraproferentemstates that ambiguities in a contract are

to be strictly construed against the drafter.'
is that:

The rationale behind the doctrine

[i]nsurance policies are almost always draftedby specialists employed
by the insurer. In light of the drafters' expertise and experience, the
insurer should be expected to set forth any limitation on its liability
clearly enough for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do
this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities
that it could have prevented with greater diligence. 9
Furthermore, the parties to a contract of insurance-the insured and the
insurer-are normally in positions of unequal bargaining power with the insurer
holding the advantage. 3 Therefore, the insured has little, if any, opportunity to
negotiate the terms of the policy. Because the insured has little control over the

127. In a case originating out of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit held that the doctrine
ofcontraproferentemis inapplicable to ERISA provisions. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1238 (1991).

However, a subsequent Eighth Circuit decision permitted the application of the proinsured doctrine in certain circumstances. Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104,
105-06 (8th Cir. 1992). "[A] court construing plans governedby ERISA should construe
ambiguities against the drafter only if, after applying ordinary principles of construction,
giving language its ordinary meaning and admitting extrinsic evidence, ambiguities
remain." Id. at 106. Additionally, a majority of courts ruling on the issue have held that
contra proferentem applies to ERISA benefit plans. See LEE R. Russ & THOMAs F.
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 7:12 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter COUCH].
128. "The rule is based upon the principle.., that when one party is responsible
for the drafting of an instrument... any ambiguity will be resolved against the drafter."
Kunin v. Benefits Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1013 (1990). "The first principle of insurance law is captured by the maxim
contraproferentem, which directs that ambiguities in a contrict be interpreted 'against
the drafter,' who is almost always the insurer." Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of
Contract Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REv. 531, 531 (1996); see also ROGER C.
HENDERSON &ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 237 (3d ed.

2001).
129. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540; see also COUCH, supranote 127, § 22:18.
130. HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 128, at 237.
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insurer's ambiguous
terms of the policy, it would be inequitable to allow the
3
terms to take precedent over reasonable expectations.1 '
Although not identical to contraproferentem, the absence of a provision
granting the administrator discretion invokes a similar rationale in determining
which standard should apply. As the drafter of the plan, the insurer has the
ability to avoid the application of de novo review in litigation over a claim
denial. The Eighth Circuit's holding requires a reviewing court to apply a de
novo standard only in the absence of any provision granting discretionary
authority to the plan administrator. M Therefore, the insurer effectively can
guarantee that a deferential standard will apply to § 1132 actions by inserting a
discretion-granting provision into the terms of the plan.
As a means of protecting plan participants, notice of any significant plan
details must be provided to participating employees. 33 If vague language fails
to provide sufficient notice," then the lack of any language also must constitute
a failure to provide notice. This is exactly the situation when there is no
provision granting the administrator discretionary authority. Consequently, it
would be inequitable to enforce against an employee a provision of which he or
she lacked notice. This is especially true when the imposition of a deferential
standard not expressly provided for within the terms of the plan would prevent
the employee from recovering benefits under the plan.
B. Consequences of the Abuse ofDiscretionStandardof Review
The application of an abuse of discretion standard would provide the
administrator an inherent advantage in the litigation of claim denials. 3 ' A denial
131. A rule stating otherwise would provide an incentive to draft an insurance
policy with ambiguous language, thus allowing the insurer to deny coverage by pointing
to the ambiguous language. Alison S. Rozbruch, Note, Resolving the ConflictBetween
Two Visionsfor a StandardofReview in ERISA DenialofBeneflt Plans,9 J.L. & POL'Y
507, 556 (2001). A pro-insurer result would "encourage employers to use vague
language to insulate themselves from having to pay out benefits owed to participants."
Id. Furthermore, use of ambiguous language does not provide the employee with clear
notice as to what rights the employee possesses in respect to the plan. Id. at 555.
"Acceptance of evasive language... provides employers and plans with an incentive to
supply inadequate notice by purposely using vague.., language." Id.
132. Riedl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 2001).
133. Rozbruch, supra note 131, at 555. "Since one of the central policies of
ERISA is to award benefit expectations, adequate notice of the rights and remedies that
a participant has is tantamount in ensuring that benefit expectations are well grounded
and to lessen the risk of disappointment." Rozbruch, supranote 131, at 555.
134. For discussion of the vagueness issue, see supra note 131.
135. Rozbruch, supra note 131, at 522. "Judicial deference to the decision of a
plan administrator sharply increases a claimant's disadvantage." Rozbruch, supra note
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of benefits will be overturned under an abuse of discretion standard only if the
reviewing court determined the administrator's decision to be unreasonable or
clearly erroneous.' 36 An abuse of discretion standard would compel a reviewing
court to uphold the administrator's decision even in situations where the insured
would suffer an inequitable result. 3 7 "[T]he subsequent application of an [abuse
of discretion] standard to a dispute is the practical equivalent of the cessation of
judicial review over that administrator's decision."' 38
C. Abuse of Discretion: The Default Rule
The purported goal of ERISA is to protect employees and their
beneficiaries.'39 The Eighth Circuit's ruling in Riedl has taken one step in the
direction of achieving the goal of protecting plan participants and their
beneficiaries by choosing not to adopt an abuse of discretion standard as the
default rule for factual determinations." 4° Nevertheless, several commentators
have argued that ERISA's goals have been compromised to some extent.' 4'
For example, following the Supreme Court's decision inBruch, drafters of
employee benefit plans began revising their language to include such provisions
and, thus, to avoid de novo review in subsequent litigation. 42 Consequently,

131, at 522.
136. Rozbruch, supra note 131, at 522.

137. Jay Conison, SuitsforBenefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,3 (1992).
"If the reasons [given for denying a claim] are acceptable, a court may even uphold a
denial of benefits that it believes to be wrong." Id.
138. Rozbruch, supra note 131, at 552.

139. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
140. See Riedl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753,756 (8th Cir. 2001). "We
hold that, absent language in the plan granting discretionary authority to the administrator
to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, fact-based
determinations should receive de novo review." 1d.
141. See, e.g., Conison, supra note 137, at 3 (arguing that the current law and
jurisprudence fail to protect employees participating in ERISA plans); Melissa Grant,

Battlingfor ERISA Benefits in the Ninth Circuit: Overcoming Abuse of Discretion
Review, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 93, 131-32 (1998) (arguing that the abuse of discretion
standard fails to promote an employee's interests); Rozbruch, supra note 131, at 561
(arguing that courts have hurt the expectations of employees by granting discretion based
on vague language); Craig M. Stephens, Note, ERISA: The Inevitable but Unexpected
TRiAL ADVOC. 151, 152(1996)
Hurdles ofthe Plaintiff's Welfare Benefit Plan,20 AM. J.
(arguing that plaintiffs in suits under ERISA face numerous obstacles in recovering
benefits).
142. Brian W. Bergland, Fundamentals of Employee Benefits Law: ERISA
Litigation, SF73 ALI-ABA 463, 470 (2001). "Today, most plans grant the ...
discretionary authority [to plan administrators]." Id.
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most claim denials are reviewed using a deferential standard ofreview.'" Given
that an experienced drafter will be able to draft clear language granting
discretionary authority to the administrator, the abuse of discretion standard has
become the default standard for all practical purposes.'"
Furthermore, several courts will apply an abuse of discretion standard even
when there is no express language granting discretion. 4 s Although a majority
of circuits have held that an abuse of discretion standard for suits involving
factual determinations is appropriate only when the plan grants discretionary
authority to the administrator,'" several of those courts also have been willing
to imply such language based on vague provisions.147 In reality, it seems
reasonable to assume that de novo review actually occurs in a limited number of
circumstances. Given the ease with which drafters may circumvent de novo
review, more may be required from the judicial system to safeguard the rights
of employees participating in benefit plans regulated by ERISA adequately.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective of ERISA, as stated by Congress, is to protect the interests
of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.'" The Eighth
Circuit has taken a positive step to promote such goals without hindering the
interests of insurers and plan administrators.' 49 By requiring the application of
de novo review to both plan interpretations and factual determinations when the
plan does not grant discretionary authority to the administrator, the Eighth
Circuit has eliminated an obstacle to an employee's subsequent recovery
pursuant to § 1132 actions. Given the ease with which drafters may circumvent
the ruling by the Eighth Circuit and the other circuits that have adopted the
majority position, this step, however, may not be enough to protect plan
participants adequately.
BRUCE NGUYEN

143. Id.
144. Grant, supranote 141, at 122.
145. Rozbruch, supranote 131, at 541-51. The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
do not require an express grant of discretionary authority in order to apply an abuse of
discretion standard. Rozbruch, supranote 131, at 541-51.
146. For a list of cases, see supranote 56.
147. See Rozbruch, supranote 131, at 530-41. The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits "have relaxed their standards for language that is sufficient to vest discretion in
the plan administrator." Rozbruch, supranote 131, at 541-42.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
149. Riedl v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 248 F.3d 753,756 (8th Cir. 2001).
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